The smart grid has emerged to meet the rapidly increasing power demand and solve environmental problems through sustainable development. Advanced power networks are being developed to improve the efficiency of power system operation and energy utilization. The advancement of power networks enables us to collect power information in real time, build a database, and optimally control it by utilizing various applications of organically constructed energy management systems. Currently, the rapid change in power infrastructure necessitates security, and the establishment of a cyber security system is essential. Therefore, this paper analyzes the functions of the power information control systems and calculates the risk level for each component by applying the security risk estimation criteria in the Korean Smart Grid security standard (SGSF-121-1-1).
Introduction
The power industry is facing various environmental changes both within and outside the country. Changes in the infrastructure of the power industry due to the construction of a smart grid and the activation of new and renewable energy have inevitably driven the technological advancement of the power information control system [1] . This technological advancement has improved the efficiency of power system operation and produced various issues in the power industry. For example, when a smart grid is constructed and operated, the power system will be exposed to various cyber threats in the information technology (IT) field [2] . Furthermore, cyber attacks are increasing in key global industries. In 2014, a Korean anti-nuclear weapons group (Who Am I) leaked the internal information of Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ld. (KHNP) through cyber attacks using malicious codes in an e-mail [3] . In the same year, the world's largest hacking event (DEFCON) announced a variety of hacking methods for intelligent watt-hour meters, and demonstrated that watt-hour meters are actually vulnerable to security by introducing simple information leaks to more complex methods of acquisition devices [4] . In 2015, a cyber attack in Ukraine caused a malicious code to spread to the internal network of a power plant, resulting in the suspension of the power information control system. This incident cut off the power supply to 80,000 households [5] . Owing to the physical characteristics of electricity, a power system requires strong real-time features and a high level of availability, and the cyber security problem is likely to cause greater complex, large damage than in the existing IT field. Therefore, it is vital to establish a security system suitable for the smart grid. This paper analyzes the function of each component of the power information control system and calculates the risk of each component by applying the security risk estimation criteria proposed in the smart grid security standard of South Korea (SGSF-121-1-1).
Structure of Power Information Control System
The components of the power information control system are defined as EMS (Energy Management Risk analysis of power information control system based on smart grid security standardization System), SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition System), MTU (Master Terminal Unit), RTU (Remote Terminal Unit), and FD (Field Device), and the functions of each component were analyzed [6] . Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the power information control system. Fig. 1 . Structure of power information control system.
EMS
EMS is the main agent that performs the core functions of power information control system (monitoring, control, analysis, planning, etc.) and is in charge of the optimum system operation based on an organic combination of diverse application programs. EMS is composed of a SCADA system, generation control and planning application program, power system analysis application program, etc. It plays an important role in the operation of power systems by regularly performing system stability evaluations and credible accident analyses based on an off-line study.
SCADA
SCADA system can be seen as the concept of EMS's sub-routine, which consists of MTU and RTU to control the power plant and substation of power system. First, the basic function of SCADA is to collect general generation, transmission, and distribution data from RTU. Based on the collected data, power plants and substations that are organically connected with EMS are controlled. The SCADA system structure generally has one or more MTU and subordinate MTUs and RTUs exist under the main MTU.
MTU
MTU is a control system that is equivalent to the brain of the SCADA system. It is a control system that has an active input and output system and enables a real-time monitoring and control of the power system through the connected RTU. In short, it collects information transmitted from the RTU for delivery to the operator in the control room and simultaneously enables the RTU to fulfill the operator's order.
RTU
RTU is a passive control system that controls on-site equipment at the command of the main MTU and processes analog power information detected from the on-site equipment into a condition available for digital communication through digital signal processing. In most cases, RTUs are located in physically separated areas. To collect the power information of all the areas from each piece of on-site equipment, the RTU is installed in a dispersed manner, over a wide area.
FD
The FD plays the role of connecting the physical layer and the power information control layer of a power system. It is subject to the final control of the main MTU and is the equipment that collects the essential information of the power system. This essential information includes the status value (circuit breaker, disconnector, ground switch, open/shut state of valves, etc.), control value (on/off condition of different power equipment and IT equipment), measurement value (pressure, fluid pressure, voltage, current, phase angle, frequency, etc.).
Criteria for Estimating Risk from Identification of Security Threats
This study uses the risk estimation method of the smart grid security standard (SGSF-121-1-1) established in South Korea in 2014 [7] , and this chapter summarizes the risk estimation criteria presented in the standard. This standard provides a procedure for ensuring the security of smart grid standards, which is applied to smart grid standards that require minimum security functions and interoperability to ensure security.
Identification of security targets
The smart grid security standard proposes identification of three types of security targets: security targets based on the objects of standardization; security targets based on the risk estimation criteria; and security targets based on communication, network, and data characteristics. If any system meets one of these three criteria for identification, its security must be ensured. To estimate the risk of a smart grid, this study adopts the second method, which is to identify the security targets based on risk estimation criteria. The criteria for identification are the risks of availability, integrity, and confidentiality, which are outlined in Table 1 . Table 1 . Criteria for identification of targets for standardization based on risk criteria 
Identification of security threats
The smart grid security standard presents 11 security threats and recommends that smart grid standard developers should estimate risk through the identification of security threats. Table 2 lists the 11 security threats presented in this standard, and the identification criteria for the major security threats defined in the standard are as follows. First, the damage of information and its ripple effects are outlined in Table 3 , which are the criteria for analyzing the threat of security violation against information from (T1) through (T6) of the 11 security threats. Table 4 lists the evaluation criteria for identification of physical security threats. Table 5 defines the criteria for the importance of the standard targets. Finally, Table 6 classifies 11 security threats according to the estimation of risk in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for five standard targets. The damage is spread to a city or larger areas.
Middle
Installed in an external space, but it is accessible only by the help of special equipment Installed in an independent space or in a space whose entrance is easily accessible by anyone
There are physical locking devices such as padlocks, and physical security devices are constructed in such a manner that, although CCTVs exist, 24/7 monitoring is not performed.
The damage is spread to the relevant devices and some peripheral devices.
Low
Installed in an independent space that is accessible only by limited people There are no special physical security devices except for locks for devices and systems.
Services can be provided even if the devices do not work. Table 5 . Criteria for importance of standard targets
Grade
Importance of standard targets
High
The damage is spread to a city or larger areas.
Middle
The damage is spread to the relevant device and some peripheral devices.
Low
Services can be provided even if the devices do not work. Table 6 . Criteria for risk estimation for standard targets depending on the identification of security threats 
Risk Evaluation Based on the Structure of the Power Information Control System
This chapter evaluates the risk based on the security threats for each component of the power information control system by applying the criteria defined in the smart grid security standard mentioned in Chapter 3.
Identification of security threats for each component of the power information control system
The security threats of each component of the power information control system were identified based on 11 security threats. First of all, Table 7 shows the threats of security violations for information (T1 ~ T6) among the 11 security threats. In Table 7 , importance was applied as the top criterion for the damage level and ripple effect. Furthermore, the information assets were matched to (T1) to (T6) depending on the presence or absence of the security threat, and the standard security threat was determined as the top criterion. Table 7 . Identification of security threats of the power information control system related to information Target  Damage level  Ripple effect  importance  T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6   EMS  High  High  High  T1-3  -T3-3  T4-3  --SCADA  High  High  High  T1-3  -T3-3  T4-3  --MTU  Middle  High  High  T1-2  T2-3  T3-2  T4-2  T5-3  T6-3   RTU  Middle  Middle  Middle  -T2-3  --T5-3  T6-3   FD  Low  Low  Low  -T2-2  --T5-2  T6-2 Next, Table 8 shows the identification of physical access security threats, and Tables 9 and 10 show the identification of security threats (T10) and (T11), respectively. Finally, the unauthorized access to network (T8) and the denial of act (T9) are defined in Table 11 . 
Risk evaluation of the power information control system
This chapter summarizes the security threats identified in Chapter 4.1 in a single table and the risk of each component of the power information control system is estimated. EMS and SCADA were classified as systems, and MTU, RTU, and FD were classified as devices. Then the risk of each component was estimated. For EMS and SCADA, the risks of confidentiality, integrity, and availability were all estimated as level 3. For MTU, RTU, and FD, which were classified as devices, the risks were estimated as level 3 for confidentiality and integrity and level 2 for availability. T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10  T11  EMS   Risk  Security threat level  T1-3  -T3-3  T4-3  --T7-1  T8-3  T9-3  -T11-3   Security   service   violation risk   Confid   entialit   y   3  ----------3   Integrit   y   --3  3  ----3  --3   Availa   bility   ------1  ---3  3 Table 13 . Risk of SCADA   Security threat  T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10  T11  SCAD   A Risk  Security threat level  T1-3  -T3-3  T4-3  --T7-1  T8-3  T9-3  -T11-3   Security   service   violation risk   Confid   entialit   y   3  ----------3   Integrit   y   --3  3  ----3  --3   Availa   bility   ------1  ---3  3   Table 14 . Risk of MTU Security threat  T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10  T11 T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10  T11  RTU  Risk  Security threat level  -T2-3  --T5-3 T6-3 T7-2 T8-2 T9-2  T10-1  T11-2   Security  service  violation  risk   Confid  entialit  y   -3  ---------3   Integrit  y   ----3  3  --2  --3 Availab ility T1  T2  T3  T4  T5  T6  T7  T8  T9  T10  T11  FD  Risk  Security threat level  -T2-3  --T5-3  T6-3  T7-2  T8-2  T9-2  T10-1  T11-2   Security  service  violation  risk   Confide  ntiality   -3  ---------3   Integrit  y   ----3  3  --2  --3   Availab  ility   ------2  --1  2  2 
Conclusion
This study identified the cyber threats of a power information control system, and estimated the risk to each component of the system.
To estimate the security risk of each component, this study applied the standardization target identification criteria and security threat identification criteria presented in the smart grid security standard. To analyze the estimated risks, the EMS and SCADA, which were classified as systems, were estimated to have the highest level of security service violation risk. Thus, more detailed security measures should be prepared for the identified security threats. Furthermore, MTU, RTU, and FD, which were classified as devices, were estimated to have risk level 3for confidentiality and integrity and risk level 2 for availability. In particular, the MTU requires more diverse security measures compared to other devices because it was identified in every security threat owing to its functional characteristics. The results of this study can be used as basic data for establishing the security requirements of a smart grid and will provide a basis for rational decision making in the development of a cyber security system that reflects the characteristics of the power system operating system. In follow-up research, more meaningful results could be obtained by establishing guidelines for security measures based on the risk for each component of the power information control system.
